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Abstract 
This paper reviews research on the origins of the financial crisis of 2008–2009, highlights the 
key events that triggered a financial panic in September 2008, and summarizes the 
extraordinary policy actions the United States (US) has taken to ameliorate the crisis. We 
discuss the proximate causes of the crisis, including the characteristics and growth of the 
subprime mortgage market, and the distorted incentives and flawed regulatory structure 
surrounding the secondary market for mortgage-backed securities. We also assess the role 
of more fundamental macroeconomic determinants of the bubble in US asset prices, most 
notably low global interest rates attributed to either loose monetary policy or excess global 
saving. We find that while low global interest rates may have contributed to the boom in 
housing markets and speculative excesses, the poorly understood innovations and 
microeconomic distortions of the financial system played a more fundamental role. Finally, 
the otherwise extraordinary policy response of the US government has been limited by the 
lack of an effective restructuring of the financial system, and a recovery marked by higher 
private saving, weak domestic investment, and a large public deficit appears to be 
unsustainable. Ultimately, the US economy will need to shift about 3% of GDP from 
domestic consumption to the export sector. This will pose some serious challenges to 
countries that have come to rely on exports to the US market. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past quarter century, American economists and policymakers have been very 
active in providing policy advice to other countries about how to avoid and/or manage 
financial crises. In many cases the essence of the advice was “you should be more like us.” 
Suddenly, the United States (US) has been hit by its own financial crisis—one that is 
extraordinary in both its breadth and severity. While prior financial panics in individual 
countries or regions have involved output declines of equal or greater magnitude, the global 
dimensions of the current crisis are unprecedented. The crisis began in the US, but has now 
spread to of the rest of the world economy. The transmission channel with Europe has been 
largely through a linkage of financial markets and institutions on both sides of the Atlantic 
that shared some of the same flaws and excesses. But for Asia and much of the developing 
world, the transmission has been largely through an extraordinary collapse of global trade. 
This paper summarizes some research on the origins of the crisis, traces the evolution of the 
credit panic that hit in late 2008, its impact on the real economy, and the extraordinary policy 
actions that have been taken to mitigate the economic losses. As with past financial crises, 
the current downturn will end and the economy will recover. However, as we argue below, 
the crisis will likely come to represent a major regime change, greatly altering the future 
shape of the US and global economies. The era of self-regulation of financial institutions is 
over, and the role of monetary policy has been greatly altered. The binge of consumer 
spending also seems to have come to an end, as households focus on rebuilding their 
balance sheets. If the US is to restore full employment, it must not only rebuild its financial 
industries but also rejuvenate its export industries and achieve a more balanced external 
position. This raises two challenges for the rest of the global economy. First, they must 
develop new drivers of demand growth; countries will not be able to rely on growing exports 
into the US market, and they will need to emphasize the development of domestic and 
regional markets. Second, frustration with the effort to develop export markets in a time of 
slow global growth may push politicians toward a more protectionist policy stance.  
2.  ORIGINS 
The precise causes of the financial crisis remain surprisingly controversial. Much of the 
recent analysis has emphasized the role of developments within the US housing and 
financial markets. Home prices began to rise rapidly in the late 1990s and, by the year 2000, 
had far exceeded the growth in either incomes or rent values (Figure 1). At their peak in 
2006, home prices were nearly 50% above a norm defined by their historical relationship to 
household income. Most analysts point to the excesses of the subprime mortgage market in 
the US and the subsequent transformation of those assets into exotic secondary market 
instruments as key factors that led to the housing price bubble. The bursting of this bubble 
and the subsequent collapse of the market for subprime mortgages initiated a chain-like 
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Figure 1: Household Income, Home Prices, and Rental Index (2000Q1=100),  
(1975Q1–2008Q4) 
 
Note: The Spliced Home Price index extends the Case-Shiller index backwards for 1975–1986 using the OFHEO 
home price index. Quarterly mean HH income is linearly interpolated from Census annual data and then adjusted so 
that the average over four quarters equals annual income exactly. The income and rental indices were adjusted so 
that their average over the period through 2001 equals that of the home price index. Fourth quarter 2008 income 























Spliced Home Price Index Mean Household Income Rental Index
Source: Standard and Poor’s (2009), Census (2007), and Bureau of Economic Analysis (2009). 
Some economists argue, however, that the excesses in the housing and mortgage-backed 
securities markets were merely proximate causes and point to what they regard as more 
fundamental determinants that created an environment in which the speculative excesses of 
the real estate and securitized asset markets could flourish. They emphasize either (i) a US 
monetary policy that remained stimulative for too long after the 2002 recession (Taylor 2009) 
or (ii) excess saving outside the US that drove down global interest rates to levels that fueled 
the speculation. While both of these hypotheses could serve to explain the consequent 
bubble in US asset prices, they do not provide an immediate explanation as to why defaults 
in a relatively small portion of the credit markets (subprime mortgages) had such 
catastrophic, system-wide consequences. 
The Subprime Market. Subprime mortgages were originally perceived as a beneficial 
development whereby a greater proportion of low-income, minorities, and higher-risk 
households could be granted access to financial markets and the opportunity to become 
homeowners. The marketing of the subprime, alt-A, and home equity loans relied on 
independent mortgage originators who were part of a financial network that developed in 
parallel to the issuance and securitization of conventional mortgages by the government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs).
1  The system of securitization operated by the GSEs 
established strict standards for conforming mortgages, requiring full documentation of the 
borrower’s financial condition and the valuation of the property. In contrast, the subprime 
market operated with fewer constraints. The originators wrote the mortgage loans, provided 
a short-term guarantee (usually 90 days), and sold the loans to private arrangers who 
subsequently pooled the mortgages and issued securities that were backed by the mortgage 
                                                  
1 Alt-A is a designation for mortgages that are deemed riskier than prime mortgages but not as risky as subprime 
mortgages. Typically, alt-A mortgage borrowers are characterized as people without full documentation, higher 
than average loan-to-value ratios, or lower credit scores.  
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pool. As a substitute for the GSE guarantees, mortgage-backed securities were rolled over 
into collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which were sold in a series of tranches where 
the junior tranches absorbed the initial defaults and senior tranches were viewed as very 
secure and were often assigned a AAA rating.  
The network of subprime operations was essentially unregulated and the originators in 
particular operated with less concern about reputational issues or loan quality. With minimal 
capital requirements, the costs of entry and exit from the industry were low. Subprime 
mortgages often incorporated low down payment requirements and a significant prepayment 
penalty.
2 Underwriting standards declined as loan originators focused on collecting fees on 
loans that they quickly resold. Due to the complexity and lack of transparency in these 
markets, purchasers of the mortgage-backed securities in the secondary market also failed 
to accurately evaluate the quality of the underlying assets and to understand the risks 
involved. Because regulators were largely absent, the major source of information on the 
risks of the mortgage-backed securities were the credit rating agencies—principally 
consisting of Standard & Poor’s, Fitch, and Moody’s. Yet these agencies also failed to 
provide an accurate assessment of risk. The credit rating agencies received payment for 
their ratings directly from the issuers of the financial products being rated, thereby creating a 
clear conflict of interest and a subsequent tendency for issuers to “shop around” for the 
agency willing to give them the highest rating. The result was a broad underestimate of the 
degree of risk associated with these new securities, and the sheer complexity of their design 
prevented many from taking a closer look.  
The non-prime mortgages described above expanded from 15% of new originations in 2001 
to 50% in 2006. The proportion of these mortgages that were securitized also rose sharply 
over the same period to reach 90% in 2007. By 2005, subprime mortgages represented 
about US$2.5 trillion out of a total residential mortgage stock of about US$11 trillion. The 
greater risk of the subprime mortgages is evident in the 12% of outstanding loans that are in 
foreclosure, compared to less than 2% for conforming mortgages. Many housing analysts 
assert that without the prominent role of subprime mortgages, the increase in home prices 
would have been choked off at a much earlier stage: potential buyers would not have been 
able to obtain a conforming mortgage at such elevated levels relative to their incomes. 
The growth of the subprime mortgage market was accompanied by a number of other 
financial innovations that camouflaged risk. When subprime mortgages began to default in 
large numbers it became difficult to accurately trace through the implications for the 
valuations of the CDOs, which did not trade on organized markets. That rapid growth of 
these securities within off-balance sheet entities called structured investment vehicles (SIVs) 
also led to large increases in the size of the issuing institutions without a matching increase 
in capital. The lower capital requirements associated with such SIVs allowed these financial 
institutions (often investment banking firms) to dramatically increase their effective leverage 
ratios.  
Further problems arose in the means by which financial institutions financed their off-balance 
sheet activities. The long-term assets such as mortgage-backed securities and CDOs were 
financed by issuing short-term liabilities such as asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) 
and overnight repurchase agreements. According to Baily, Litan, and Johnson. (2008), of the 
enormous growth in the issuance of ABCP from around US$30 billion in February 2005 to 
over US$80 billion in early 2008, nearly all had a maturity of between one and four days. 
Because these liabilities were cheaper than long-term borrowing, they allowed financial 
institutions to fund their high-value mortgage-backed assets at a substantial margin. While 
asset prices continued to rise, rolling over these short-term commitments did not pose a 
serious problem. It was not until credit markets dried up and risk premiums increased 
                                                  
2 There are a number of papers that review the operations of the subprime market and its role in initiating the 
financial crisis. We found the following to be particularly useful: Gramlich (2007); Baily, Litan, and Johnson 
(2008); Gorton (2008); Ashcraft and Schuerman (2008), and Hatzius (2008). 
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sharply in 2008 that financial institutions found themselves not only with falling asset prices 
but also exposed to a severe maturity mismatch. As banks were forced to move the SIVs 
onto their balance sheet or were unable to roll-over their short-term liabilities, their leverage 
ratios increased further.  
The emphasis on subprime mortgage defaults and the consequent insolvency of major 
financial firms as the primary cause of the recession highlights concern about the risks of 
financial innovation. Past innovations were perceived as major contributors to growth and 
the efficiency of the US financial system and a rationale for sharply limiting regulation. Yet, 
the costs of this crisis will outweigh the benefits of financial market innovations for decades 
to come.  
Fundamental Factors. Asset market bubbles like that of the US housing market have been 
common throughout history, and the rapid price rise was not limited to the US alone. From 
1997 to 2007, housing prices were rising even more rapidly in several European countries, 
including Spain, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Some researchers suggest that the 
repetitive nature of asset price bubbles and the cross-national pattern of the housing price 
increases point to more fundamental underlying causal factors than innovations in US 
mortgage markets alone. The most obvious candidate is a low level of nominal and real 
interest rates in the US and in the global economy. The nominal and real rates of interest for 
US 10-year government bonds are reported in Figure 2. The inflation adjustment is based on 
a survey of inflation expectations.
3 The estimated real rate displays a fairly consistent 
downward trend from 1980 to the present. Lacking a measure of inflation expectations for 
other countries, we constructed an alternative estimate of the real bond rate using a Hodrick-
Prescott filter to smooth the actual inflation rate. Those results are shown in Figure 3 for 
Germany, Japan, UK, and US.
4 The two measures of the real interest rate for the US are 
quite similar, suggesting that a simple average of actual rates of inflation may be adequate 
for many purposes. Both nominal and real interest rates have fallen to levels not seen since 
the 1970s; but, the decline in real rates extends over the past quarter century, and they do 
not seem abnormally low by the standards of earlier decades.
5 Thus, it is not evident that 
the extent of the decline or the absolute level of real interest rates in the current decade is 
unprecedented. The current low level of interest rates, however, is at the center of 
explanations that place the blame for the financial crisis on either mistakes in US monetary 
policy or an excess of global saving. 
                                                  
3 The measure of the real interest rate is constructed using survey data on 10-year expected inflation from the 
Survey of Professional Forecasters (1990–2007), and a survey of financial market participants for 1981–1989. 
Expected inflation for years before 1981 was constructed by the staff of the Federal Reserve. The data was 
obtained from Clark and Nakata (2008). 
4 Quarterly data on nominal interest rates and GDP price deflators was taken from the data files of the OECD. 
5 The behavior of nominal and real rates over the past 150 years in the US was examined in Summers (1983). 
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Note: Real rates calculated based on GDP price deflators using a Hodrick-Prescott filter. The consumer price index 
(CPI) is used for Germany and Japan  
Source: US: Federal Reserve Board of Governors (2009a) and Bureau of Economic Analysis (2009); UK, Germany, 
and Japan: OECD (2009b). 
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Taylor (2009) offers the most prominent critique of US monetary policy in the years leading 
up to the crisis. He asserts that the monetary authorities, by holding short-term rates at too 
low a level in the aftermath of the 2002 recession, contributed in a major way to the housing 
price bubble of 2003–2006. He conducted a counterfactual simulation showing that a 
monetary policy more consistent with the rules-based approach of 1980–2000 would have 
raised interest rates, cut off the boom in the housing market at an earlier stage, and, by 
inference, prevented many of the excesses that developed in the subprime market. In their 
defense, the monetary authorities were seeking in 2002–2003 to counter what was widely 
seen as a jobless recovery in the midst of low inflation. When growth accelerated in early 
2004, policy did change and interest rates were steadily increased over the next two years. 
Thus, much of the discrepancy between Federal Reserve Board policy and Taylor’s 
preferred path is limited to 2002–2003.  
Alternatively, some economists have linked the mortgage market crisis to the large external 
imbalances of prior years and what they perceive to have been an excess of saving outside 
the US. That argument gained momentum after a speech by Ben Bernanke in 2005 in which 
he asserted that, rather than the US saving too little, the rest of the world saves too much 
(Bernanke 2005). It became fashionable to focus on the saving-investment balances of the 
surplus countries, rather than that of the US. In effect, the US was perceived as passively 
accommodating imbalances that originated in Asia after the 1997–1998 financial crisis 
(Cooper 2008). The capital inflows in turn drove down real interest rates and enabled the 
excess consumption and speculative excesses in the US.
6 That perspective has gained 
popularity in the US, where an increasing number of economists have written about the 
saving surplus that emerged in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2005 and later 
years.
7 In contrast to Taylor, advocates of the surfeit of saving perspective trace the low 
level of interest rates to global factors outside the US. However, both explanations go on to 
relate the excesses of a house-price bubble and exorbitant risk-taking in the subprime 
market to low interest rates.  
Given the accounting identity that global saving must match global investment, it is not very 
meaningful to simply divide the global aggregate into two regions and assign a direction of 
causality, as Bernanke did. If the US has a large current account deficit, the rest of the world, 
by definition, must have a surplus. It is equally difficult to attribute a current account surplus 
either to an excess of saving or a shortfall of investment without constructing a 
counterfactual. In addition, a focus on ex post saving and investment may be a poor guide to 
a priori plans. 
Regional saving and investment patterns are summarized in Figure 4. At the global level 
(Panel 1), saving has risen from the lows of the 2002 recession; the growing importance of 
the (high saving) developing countries is enough to offset a declining rate of saving in the 
advanced economies. The 2007 rate is about 1% of GDP above the average of the 1990s. 
The S-I balance of the US, shown in Panel 2, indicates a longstanding decline in saving that 
began in the early 1980s. A portion of the recent drop can be traced to the re-occurrence of 
sustained negative saving in the public sector, but the private saving rate has also remained 
at historically low levels. On the other hand, the US has continued to offer very good 
investment opportunities—superior to those of most other industrial countries—and the 
investment rate shows no secular pattern of decline comparable to that for saving. The result 
has been heavy reliance on foreign capital inflows, but with few strains as foreigners also 
                                                  
6 One of the most developed models is presented in Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008). The perspective of 
excess saving outside the US as the primary cause of low interest rates is echoed in the comments of 
Lawrence Summers, Bradford DeLong, and Richard Cooper at the 2008 conference where the paper of 
Caballero and others was presented. See also Cooper (2008). 
7 In some respects, it is reminiscent of the debate between the US and Japan on the origins of the two countries’ 
external imbalances in the 1980s. In that period, US economists emphasized excess saving and a current 
account surplus in Japan as a primary cause of the external imbalances between the two countries, whereas 
Japanese policymakers pointed to a large public sector deficit and declining private saving in the US. 
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perceived the US as offering attractive investment opportunities. Rates of both saving and 
investment have declined in advanced economies other than the US (Panel 3), but largely in 
a parallel fashion that led to no consistent shift in the S-I balance. 
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Source: OECD (2009a), OECD (2009c), World Bank (2009), and various country statistical agencies. 
As shown in the fifth panel, the economies of emerging Asia have long had extraordinarily 
high rates of saving and investment. The high investment rate was tied to their rapid rates of 
overall economic growth and the need for a matching expansion of the capital stock. 
Similarly high rates of income growth are associated with elevated rates of saving and it may 
be that the saving has been augmented by a sharp reduction in the birth rate (Bosworth and 
Chodorow-Reich 2006). However, it is strikingly apparent that the large change in the S-I 
balance is on the investment side, due to its limited recovery in the aftermath of the 1997–
1998 financial crisis. There is also a rise in the S-I surplus after 2004 that can be traced to a 
surge of saving in the PRC and the emergence of a large current account surplus. Finally, 
the post-2004 period is also notable for a large saving surplus in the Middle East oil-
producing countries (Panel 6). 
The result of these regional patterns of saving and investment has been the current account 
balances shown in Table 1 in which the US has an extraordinarily large deficit and the other 
regions of the world are in net surplus. However, the change relative to the 1990s is in the 
growth of the US deficit and the increased surpluses of emerging Asia and the Middle East. 
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Table 1: Current Account as Share of World GDP, Selected Regions and Years 
Percent                
       
Region  1980-89 1990-99 2000-04  2005  2008 
                 
US  -0.50 -0.43 -1.37 -1.62 -1.07 
Japan  0.26 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.31 
Europe
1  0.00 0.08 0.22 0.27 0.02 
Emerging Asia
2  -0.01 0.06 0.34 0.53 0.80 
Emerging Latin America
3  -0.11 -0.14 -0.04 0.09 -0.03 
Middle East
4  0.12 -0.04 0.07 0.45 0.71 
Unallocated  -0.53 -0.31 -0.33 0.12  0.56 
1. Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden. 
2. PRC; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Republic of Korea; Taipei,China; and 
Thailand. First column average for 1982–1989.  
3. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. 
4. Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, 
and Yemen. 
Source: OECD (2009a), OECD (2009c), IMF (2009b), World Bank (2009), and various country statistical agencies. 
We construct a normative standard for evaluating saving and investment in each region by 
estimating a “warranted” rate of investment that is based on the trend rate of growth of 
output and an assumed constant capital-output ratio. That is, we estimated the rate of 
investment required to maintain balanced growth along an estimated potential output path. 
The warranted investment rate, I /Y, is defined as  
   (1)    k d g Y ⋅ + = ) ( / I , 
where  g = trend growth of output, 
  d = depreciation rate,  
  k = capital-output ratio. 
Specific values for each region are shown in Table 2. The growth rate is based on the 
estimated annual growth of GDP over the period of 1995–2007, and the depreciation rates 
and capital-output ratios are rough averages taken from Bosworth and Collins (2003). The 
bottom portions of the table report the warranted investment rate and the actual saving and 
investment rates for the global economy, US economy, aggregate of other advanced 
economies, developing economies, economies of emerging markets of East Asia, and PRC 
over the period of 2002–2007. 
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Table 2: Warranted Investment vs. Actual Investment:  
Select Economy Groups, (1995–2007) 







            
Trend Output Growth  3.1  3.0  2.7  5.5  7.6  9.6 
            
Capital-Output Ratio  2.8  3.0  3.0  2.5  2.5  2.5 
Depreciation 5.0  5.0  5.0  5.0  5.0  5.0 
            
Warranted Investment 
Rate 22.2  24.1  23.2  26.3  31.5  36.6 
            
Actual Saving  22.4  14.3  19.9  30.3  39.8  48.5 
Actual Investment  22.2  19.2  20.6  27.2  35.7  40.2 
*PRC values for saving and investment are taken from World Bank: World Development Indicators (2009). 
Source: IMF (2009b). 
The warranted investment rate for the global economy is estimated at about 22%, which is 
very close to the observed average for 2002–2007. Thus, judged by this standard, recent 
rates of global saving and investment seem quite normal. The warranted investment rate of 
the US is estimated to be slightly higher than the global average because of a higher capital-
output ratio. However, the striking feature in the US is the extremely low level of national 
saving, which is sufficient to finance only about 60% of long-run investment needs. Actual 
rates of investment also appear a little low in 2002–2007, perhaps because the falling 
relative price of capital goods has reduced the required nominal magnitudes.
8 In developing 
countries and the emerging economies of East Asia, the higher long-term output growth 
rates yield much higher estimates of the warranted rate of investment, but there are 
indications of an excess of saving in the current decade that becomes particularly large after 
2004. The surplus also seems particularly large in East Asia (and the PRC in particular) 
where both actual saving and investment are well above the warranted rate. The largest 
percentage surplus, however, is in the oil-producing states of the Middle East. Overall, it is 
hard to support the view that global saving is particularly high. Instead, it seems misallocated 
across regions relative to investment. It is not evident that those imbalances should translate 
into a particularly strong impact on the level of global interest rates.  
The methodology does leave a considerable range of uncertainty, however. We used a 
lower capital-output ratio for the developing countries (2.5) than the advanced economies 
(3.0), but it might be reasonable to argue for a higher marginal rate in the former as part of a 
catch-up process. If we use the same marginal capital-output ratio in both regions, there is a 
small saving deficiency in the developing world as a whole, but still a surplus in East Asia. In 
both regions, the actual rate of investment falls short of that required for balanced growth. 
While the regional imbalances in saving and investment are sufficient to account for the 
regional imbalances in trade flows, it is difficult to believe that the relatively small deviations 
of global saving from our investment norm or from the historical average are sufficient to 
provide the basis for an ever-declining real interest rate and a global financial crisis. It 
implies an extraordinary fragility of financial markets. 
The emphasis on foreign capital inflows into the US as the primary causal factor also 
presents some puzzles. First, the US exchange rate fell continuously from mid-2002 up to 
the intensification of the crisis in the fall of 2008. The JPMorgan trade-weighted real 
exchange rate indicates a 30% decline over the six years (Figure 11). If the motivating force 
behind the global imbalances was a strong demand for dollar-denominated assets, we would 
                                                  
8  In addition, the US has long reported a much lower lever of general government investment than other 
countries. 
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have expected a currency appreciation.
9 Second, we do not see any evidence of a widening 
of risk spreads between BAA corporate and government bond rates within the US, as would 
be expected if the inflows were motivated by a foreign demand for the safest assets. Instead, 
risk differentials decline in the years after the 2002 recession and were slightly smaller than 
the average of the 1990s. 
Another complication with the capital flows explanation is the possibility that the wealth effect 
associated with rising housing prices led to a consumption boom, which in turn drove the US 
current account into greater deficits. Thus, the direction of causation could run from 
increased house prices to capital flows, rather than the other way around. Aizenman and 
Jinjarak (2008) formally explore the relationship between current account balances (and 
hence capital flows) and the relative prices of national real estate markets. While they 
generally identify the causation as flowing from past current account deficits to present real 
estate price increases in a panel of countries, a Granger causality exercise for the US alone 
does suggest the presence of a two-way causality between housing wealth and the current 
account. Another study by Bracke and Fidora (2008) uses a structural VAR analysis to 
distinguish between the “excess liquidity” and “saving glut” hypotheses. They interpret their 
results as suggesting that excess monetary liquidity is the more important factor. 
In summary, it seems reasonable to argue that a low level of global interest rates contributed 
to the asset price boom in housing markets and the speculative excesses. However, low real 
rates also characterized earlier decades without leading to the speculative excesses we 
have recently witnessed. We believe that the main reason for the speculative excesses is 
that the low interest rates of recent years impinged on a substantially different financial 
structure, especially in the US. The evolution of financial markets in the intervening years 
gradually led to behavior that encouraged speculative activity and systematically made it 
both more difficult for financial firm executives to evaluate risk and more rewarding to tilt the 
emphasis toward short-term gains in making risk-reward trade-offs. The promotion of new 
financial innovations (the “originate and distribute” lending model, CDOs, and over-the-
counter sale of derivatives) without a rigorous effort to evaluate their implications for 
systemic risk, a compensation system that emphasized high immediate returns, and a 
compliant financial regulatory structure all stand out as important direct contributors.
10 It is 
difficult to explain the crisis in terms of macroeconomic conditions without reference to the 
microeconomic distortions in the US financial system.  
3.  THE FINANCIAL PANIC OF 2008 
The housing price bubble burst in mid-2006 and both housing prices and housing starts 
began a long period of contraction (Figure 5). With declining home prices, borrowers were 
unable to refinance their loans and default rates soared (Figure 6). Against this backdrop, 
problems in the markets for mortgages and mortgage-backed securities festered for over two 
years. The situation exploded into a full-blown financial panic only in September of 2008 with 
three major events: the government takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on 8 
September, the Lehman bankruptcy on 15 September, and the Federal Reserve’s bailout of 
AIG on 16 September. In all three cases, the firms were unable to refinance their debt 
because of increasing investor/partner uncertainty. 
                                                  
9 The exchange rate index of the Federal Reserve shows a smaller 25% decline. The difference is largely due to 
the use of the CPI in the Federal Reserve measure compared to wholesale prices excluding food and fuel in 
the JPMorgan index. Differences in the trade weights used for aggregation also have some effect. 
10 The role of compensation schemes is discussed in Bebchuk and Fried (2003). 
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Source: Census Bureau (2009) and Bureau of Economic Analysis (2009). 
 
 





















Source: Mortgage Banker's Association (2009). 
In the case of the two mortgage firms, the basic problem seemed quite simple: they departed 
from their core function of providing support for the securitization of high quality mortgages 
and began engaging in large-scale purchases on their own account of high-risk, high-yield 
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subprime mortgages that did not meet their own underwriting standards. They lacked the 
capital to support such activities, and once the government stepped in with a guarantee, 
private investors fled in fear of a takeover that would wipe out their equity.  
Lehman was in some respects a bank, but with the critical distinction that, unlike the 
deposits of a commercial bank, its short-term liabilities were not insured. Thus, when rumors 
spread about losses on its longer-term assets—particularly mortgages—it could not sustain 
a refinancing requirement that amounted to about US$100 billion per month. Lehman was a 
major participant in the market for mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and CDOs. It became 
a prime example of the difficulties of valuing these financial instruments and the 
uncertainties surrounding the solvency of the institutions that held them. The crisis of 
confidence spread to the remaining investment banks that were either taken over by merger 
or converted to holding companies under the Federal Reserve’s supervision. A large money 
market fund failed or “broke the buck” after writing off debt from Lehman. The result was a 
run on mutual funds and a disruption of the commercial paper market. 
AIG had become a major provider of credit default swaps (CDS) that serve as insurance 
contracts against default for a wide range of financial instruments. The purchaser makes 
periodic payments in return for a payoff in the event of a default on a specified financial 
instrument. Their issuance is unregulated, however, and the purchaser need not actually 
own the underlying insured instrument. Thus, like other financial derivatives, the CDS can 
serve as a tool of either hedging or speculation. It is also sold over the counter rather than 
on organized exchanges. The market has grown at an explosive rate from about US$1 
trillion in 2000 to over US$50 trillion by mid-2008. 
Initially, AIG was effectively selling its AAA rating to debt issuers of lower quality; but once 
the magnitude of its activities became known and the performance of the original debt 
issuers deteriorated, AIG lost its high-quality rating and began to face pressures from 
counterparties to increase the collateral behind the insurance. That pushed the firm into a 
large negative cash flow position and forced it to sell assets at discounted prices.  
Precipitated by the failure or government takeover of these three institutions, and amidst 
growing pressures for a more coordinated and systematic response, the Bush administration 
requested US$700 billion in funds from Congress on 19 September. The Troubled Asset 
Relief Plan (TARP) was initially voted down by Congress on 29 September, but later passed 
on 3 October. In the intervening period, the financial panic had spread to incorporate the 
broader equity markets. Between 19 September and 9 October, the stock market plummeted 
by 28%. In addition, a general loss of confidence and extraordinary levels of uncertainty led 
to a freezing of significant portions of the financial system. 
Half the TARP funds were disbursed over the remainder of 2008. The stock market fell 
sharply again in early 2009 when the new Obama administration failed to produce a decisive 
plan to deal with the financial problems. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve reduced the 
federal funds rate to 0–¼% and created a wide range of lending facilities to supply credit 
directly to submarkets of the financial system.  
While the difficulties of the banks have occupied most of the public’s attention, it is important 
to remember that they account for only a portion of total credit flows in the US economy. In 
the years prior to the crisis, 70–80% of the borrowing of nonfinancial borrowers was in the 
form of loans from commercial banks and similar direct-lending institutions. However, large 
portions of that debt were subsequently securitized and reissued as marketable debt 
instruments. After deducting reissuance of asset-backed securities (ABS), commercial 
banks’ share of the debt issues declined to an average of 40% in 2000–2006, and direct-
market lending grew in importance. The market for agency issues of mortgage-backed 
securities has continued to function, but funds raised through ABS issues, which accounted 
for 25% of the credit flow in 2000–2006, turned negative in late 2007 and contracted by 
US$400 billion in 2008. Thus, the freezing of credit flows in late 2008 extended beyond the 
banking sector alone. 
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4.  REAL SECTOR IMPLICATIONS 
Up to September 2008, few forecasters anticipated a serious economic decline. The general 
expectation was that the fall in housing construction would be offset by an expansion of 
exports, as a declining dollar would strengthen the country’s competitive position. For 
example, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) published a budget update in early 
September that reflected its survey of a wide range of private economic forecasts. GDP 
growth was estimated to be slightly above 1% annually in 2008 and 2009, and a recovery 
with a 3.6% growth rate was projected for 2010. In the aftermath of the September financial 
turmoil, GDP declined at an annual rate of 6% and is now expected to continue to fall 
throughout most of 2009. In its January 2009 assessment, the CBO reduced its projected 
level of GDP by 4% for 2009 and 6% for 2010 and 2011. Similar large revisions are evident 
in the IMF projections for the global economy. Clearly the events of September had a very 
large impact on expectations of the future course of the economy. 
In the fourth-quarter 2008 GDP report, production losses were very widespread. 
Consumption and private investment both contributed 3 percentage points each to the 
decline. In addition, a steep decline in exports accounted for an additional 3 percentage 
points that was largely offset by an equally significant fall in imports. Government spending 
recorded a small positive growth. The CBO’s March 2009 economic forecast, published after 
passage of the economic stimulus program, projected a 3% drop in GDP in 2009, followed 
by a return to a 3% growth rate in 2010 (Figure 7). According to the CBO, the unemployment 
rate would rise from 4.7% in 2007 to 9% in 2010, but decline rapidly in the following years. 
Both the Administration and the CBO adhere to projections of rapid recovery.  
Figure 7: Potential and Forecasted GDP Growth  











































Note: The quarterly GDP values from CBO are interpolated from annual values. 
Source: Congressional Budget Office (2009) and Office of Management and Budget (2009). 
At present, the projections of the administration and the CBO seem optimistic, particularly 
because of the delays in establishing a program for resolving the financial sector problems. 
In addition to the CBO and administration forecasts displayed in Figure 7, we also include a 
more pessimistic projection that differs most fundamentally by not incorporating a rapid 
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recovery phase. While past recessions have tended to be V-shaped, with a sharp 
contraction of economic activity followed by an equally sharp expansion, recoveries from 
financial crises seem more gradual and are normally stretched out over several years 
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2008). 
One major reason for anticipating a slow recovery involves the very large wealth losses 
experienced by households. Despite a near zero rate of saving, the wealth-income ratio 
within the household sector, driven by capital gains, rose dramatically over the past quarter 
century from an average of 4.8 in 1960–1980 to a peak of 6.3 during the dot-com bubble of 
2000. After the 2002 recession, it recovered to a peak of 6.5 in 2006, mainly as a reflection 
of rising home prices. The most straightforward explanation for the low rate of household 
saving during the period is this large increase in the stock of household wealth. If 
consumption is a function of income and wealth, the saving rate will be inversely related to 
the wealth-income ratio. As shown in Figure 8, capital gains were more than sufficient to 
offset the decline in saving throughout the 1990s and the current decade. But at valuations 
in effect at the end of 2008, the wealth-income ratio has fallen back to the historical average 
of 4.8. Thus, it would seem that households may need to devote several years of increased 
saving to rebuild their financial balance sheets. If that is the case, consumption can be 
expected to remain 2–3% of GDP below the share that was prevalent prior to the crisis. 




























Note: Computed from tables B100 and R100 of the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds Accounts. Net investment flows 
were converted to real values, cumulated, and converted back to nominal values. 
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors (2009b). 
5.  THE POLICY RESPONSE 
American policy reacted to the post-September events in a very aggressive fashion. The 
traditional tool of monetary policy was quickly exhausted as the target for the benchmark 
federal funds rate was reduced to between zero and 0.25%. The Federal Reserve moved on 
to implement a radical range of new policy actions involving direct participation in markets for 
private securities. The Congress also approved a multi-year fiscal stimulus program that 
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amounts to about 2% of GDP in 2009 and 2010 before tailing off in later years. However, the 
government has stumbled in its efforts to clean up and restore the financial system. 
Monetary Policy. The Federal Reserve began to ease interest rates in September 2007, and 
by the end of 2008, the federal funds rate had been effectively reduced to zero. However, 
even before the Bear-Stearns bankruptcy in March 2008, the Federal Reserve began to 
expand its operations into non-traditional areas that came to involve the direct supply of 
credit to a wide range of financial markets. Most notable are: (i) a Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility (CPFF), which finances the purchase of commercial paper directly from 
eligible issuers; (ii) the Term Auction Facility (TAF), which allows banks and other financial 
institutions to pledge collateral in exchange for a loan; and (iii) the direct purchase of 
mortgage-backed securities issued by the three government-sponsored enterprises. In 
addition, the Federal Reserve has recently become active in restoring the operation of 
securitization markets through the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF).  
The sum of these actions has seen the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve swell from 
under US$900 billion in August of 2008 to over US$2 trillion by March 2009 (see Figure 9).
11 
Some estimate that the amount could top US$4 trillion after all of the promised measures are 
enacted. Responding to a global shortage of dollars, the Federal Reserve has also engaged 
in currency swap arrangements with 14 foreign central banks. The government also 
guaranteed the new debt of commercial banks as a means of improving the liquidity of the 
system. These programs have largely succeeded in restoring liquidity and to some extent 
they can substitute for private financial intermediaries who are not active in some markets; 
but they cannot directly address the problems of financial institutions that are threatened with 
insolvency. The Federal Reserve has stopped short of the purchase of the equities of private 
firms. 
                                                  
11 Some of the new policy measures were adopted prior to September, but their effect was largely limited to the 
composition as opposed to the size of the Fed’s balance sheet. These activities are sometimes referred to as 
quantitative easing, but the term does not really fit. The focus is not on increasing the supply of money, but 
rather the intervention in specific credit markets to influence both the maturity structure and risk premiums on 
interest rates for different forms of private credit.   
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*Other is composed of "other assets", "float" plus the discount window, primary dealer and other broker-dealer credit, 
asset-backed commercial paper money market mutual fund liquidity facility, credit extended to AIG, the Term Asset-
Backed Securities Loan Facility, and equity holdings for AIG and Bear-Stearns. 
Treasury securities include repurchase agreements. 
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors (2009a) 
Fiscal Policy. The Congress passed an economic stimulus program in late February that 
calls for a combination of tax cuts and expenditure increases equal to US$787 billion, but 
many evaluations exclude the extension of some existing tax measures from the 
computation of the stimulus and estimate the actual effect at US$720 billion (4.8% of GDP). 
As shown in Table 3, the measures are spread over several years, with about 40% to be 
spent in 2009 and a slightly smaller amount in 2010. Roughly 90% of the total stimulus will 
take place during the first three years. The bulk of the program takes the form of expenditure 
increases, but they are scheduled to be temporary and the program should have only 
modest effects on the long-term budget situation. Both the Obama administration and the 
CBO project a strong recovery in 2010 and 2011 and a return to trend growth by 2011. 
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Table 3: Schedule and Composition of 2009 US Fiscal Stimulus 




         
Total  283 259 121  56  719 
(as percent of GDP)  2.0  1.8  0.8  0.4  5.0 
         
Revenue measures  99  116  37  -33  219 
Individual  income  37 80 32     
Corporate income  57  32  -2     
Other  5 4 7     
         
Expenditure measures  184  143  84  89  500 
Infrastructure and other  32  47  47  78  204 
Safety nets  77  14  5  7  103 
State aid and education  75  82  32  3  192 
a Total reported amount excludes the temporary "patch" of approximately US$68 billion providing taxpayer relief with 
respect to the Alternative Minimum Tax. This amount is included in the baseline stimulus of US$787 billion reported 
by the CBO. 
Source: IMF (2009a) and CBO (2009). 
Much of the debate over the fiscal stimulus has centered on its relative composition of tax 
reductions, transfer payments, and infrastructure projects. Infrastructure spending is 
believed to have the largest multiplier effects, but historically the projects are subject to long 
lags. Tax cuts can be enacted in a short time period, but some economists argue that the 
stimulus effects of temporary tax measures are particularly small.
12 This issue was taken up 
again in two important studies that tracked the effects of the 2002 tax stimulus (Johnson, 
Parker, and Souleles 2006; Agarwal, Liu, and Souleles 2007). Using micro data, both of 
these studies concluded that the spending of low-income and credit-constrained households 
responded strongly to the tax rebates. Because the US downturn is expected to last for 
several years, the lag in expenditure programs was a less effective argument than in the 
past, and the stimulus measure that emerged from the Congress included a very diversified 
set of programs, some with short lags and others stretching several years into the future. 
The federal government entered the recession with a substantial budge imbalance, and the 
additional fiscal measures, including the financial bailout (TARP), yield a fiscal deficit near 
US$2 trillion for FY2009 and US$1.5 trillion in FY2010. Absent further actions, the deficit 
would decline back below US$0.5 trillion in later years. However, the Obama administration 
also has an ambitious domestic agenda of its own, which is projected to push the long-term 
deficit up to about US$1 trillion per year (4–5% of GDP). The trends in federal outlays and 
revenues as shares of GDP are displayed in Figure 10. These ratios have been quite stable 
throughout the last half-century, in the range of 20% (except for a modest downward 
movement of the expenditure share in the 1990s due to the end of the cold war, and a 
coincident rise in the revenue share during the high-tech boom in equity markets). 
Expenditures are now projected to rise up to about 24% of GDP, with revenues staying in 
the range of 18–19%. 
                                                  
12 A more general discussion of the role of fiscal policy for counter-cyclical stabilization is provided by Auerbach 
(2005). 
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Source: CBO (2009)  
Financial Reconstruction. Creating an effective policy for restructuring the financial system is 
the greatest problem still facing the government. The basic framework of a program is well 
known as similar plans have been executed in both the US and other countries (Waxman 
1998). The first step is an accurate assessment of the losses in individual financial 
institutions. That is followed by a process of writing off the losses against equity capital and 
perhaps moving the non-performing assets to a separate asset management corporation, 
which would subsequently sell off these assets over a sustained time-period. Third, the 
affected financial institutions must be either closed or recapitalized so that there is no 
continuing uncertainty about their financial condition. The experience of several countries 
would suggest the potential for a fourth component of this process, which involves restarting 
the lending process and restoring trust in the financial system after the banks are 
recapitalized. In subsequent years, those banks that are taken over by the government can 
be sold back to the private sector.  
For the US, the major problem seems to be the magnitude of the funds that are required and 
the difficulty of obtaining congressional authorization. Hence, the new administration has not 
taken the conventional path. Instead, it has sought to provide guarantees and other 
incentives to attract private-sector partners. The Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP) 
will use US$75–100 billion of TARP funds to form public-private partnerships aimed at 
purchasing distressed loans and securities.
13 Those partnerships will be able to leverage 
their funds further through FDIC guarantees of their debt and by borrowing from the US 
Treasury. However, the risks to the partners are very asymmetric in that the private firm’s 
losses are limited to their original investment—the government loans and guarantees are 
nonrecourse—while they participate fully in any gains. While the program is expected to 
attract some participants, it does not directly address the need for additional equity capital. 
The fear is that the administration will not act on a scale sufficient to provide a comfortable 
                                                  
13 Details are available at: http://treas.gov/press/releases/tg65.htm. 
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level of capital in the financial system, and the de-leveraging and other financial 
uncertainties will be allowed to fester for years, as was the case in Japan. 
The debate over the financial recovery program continues to be driven by a basic 
disagreement over the condition of financial institutions—particularly the banks. Critics of the 
Administration’s policies believe that large portions of the financial system are fundamentally 
insolvent, and thus some version of the procedure outlined above for removing bad assets 
and recapitalizing the system is a prerequisite for a sustained recovery. Such a program 
would require far more resources that those left in the TARP program. Others believe that 
the declines in asset values have overshot as the result of the panic, and that the passage of 
time will resolve many of the solvency problems. The second perspective seems to motivate 
the Administration’s relatively modest proposals for reconstructing the banks combined with 
its wait-and-see approach. 
Even if the current crisis can be resolved, the US is faced with the need to rebuild large 
portions of the financial system on a new institutional structure. Having intervened to bail out 
large numbers of financial firms, rampant moral hazards make a return to the old system 
impossible. Yet it is difficult to outline a new structure without knowing what portions of the 
old system will survive. The Federal Reserve in particular will have the formidable challenge 
of reversing its current course and returning to its former arms-length interaction with the 
financial system. Clearly, the new system will involve more regulatory oversight, but an 
effective formula for anticipating systemic risks has yet to be developed.  
Many see increased regulation as a solution to the prior problems, but the history of 
regulation in the US is that the regulated ultimately capture the regulator and convert the 
process to restrict competition. This is particularly true in the financial area, where Wall 
Street firms and the tremendous rents they could dispense came to have a dominating 
influence on US government policy. Instead, greater attention should be given to reversing 
the concentration of economic power in the hands of large financial institutions and a return 
to a more competitive system with a fundamental focus on simple transparency and 
standardized transactions in open markets. 
The future structure of monetary policy is also very problematic. The earlier emphasis on 
narrow policy rules, such as inflation targeting, appears to have left policymakers blind to a 
wider range of concerns such as asset market bubbles and excessive risk taking. Yet the 
broadening of the agenda necessarily implies a more powerful and discretionary role for 
monetary authorities, which will heighten concerns about accountability. 
6.  GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS 
An end to the consumption binge of the last decade should be good news for the US 
economy. A lessened focus on domestic consumption would imply a shift of resources 
toward the export sector and a gradual reduction in the current US account imbalance to 
more sustainable levels. However, export-led growth will be a difficult achievement in a 
depressed global economy in which many countries may see exports as a route out of the 
recession. In addition, the panic that hit the global financial system in late 2008 has initiated 
a flight to the safety of US Treasury securities and an appreciation of the US dollar that has 
undone about half of the prior depreciation that had been underway since mid-2002 
(Figure 11). 
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Source: JP Morgan (2009). 
A reasonable future scenario would assume that a large dose of fiscal stimulus would 
ultimately lift the US economy out of recession; but the recovery is likely to be marked by a 
higher private saving rate, weak domestic investment, and a very large government budget 
deficit. That is not a sustainable domestic situation, and the economy will ultimately have to 
be restructured with a much greater focus on exports. Using 2000–2005 as a benchmark, 
the US needs to shift a minimum of 3% of GDP from domestic consumption to the export 
sector. The shift of expenditures into the export market will require a substantial depreciation 
of the dollar exchange rate on a trade-weighted basis. Past research suggests that the price 
elasticities of exports and imports are both about unity. Thus, the required long-run 
depreciation of the dollar is about 30%.  
Surprisingly, that process was actually underway prior to the crisis: the real exchange rate 
was down about 30% from its 2002 peak, and the trade imbalance had already fallen by 
about 1% of GDP from its 2005 level. At current levels of the dollar, however, it is not at all 
clear that the process of expenditure switching will continue. It seems more likely that 
pressures to engineer a quick recovery will lead to a heavy reliance on fiscal stimulus and a 
higher public sector deficit as an offset to increased private saving. Perhaps continued fiscal 
deficits will intensify foreign concerns about increased investment in dollar-denominated 
assets, and place downward pressure on the dollar. Such a process would promote the 
desired shift of resources into the tradables sector. 
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7.  CONCLUSIONS 
This review has summarized some of the research on the proximate and fundamental 
determinants of the current financial crisis. The enormous growth of the subprime mortgage 
market, and the lack of regulation and prudent lending procedures that characterized this 
market, appear to be the most decisive factors. The complexity of the subsequent mortgage-
backed securities led to the general failure of both regulators and purchasers to adequately 
assess the risks associated with these assets. It is reasonable to suggest that a low level of 
global interest rates helped create an environment conducive to the bubble in housing 
markets. However, we believe this was a contributing rather than fundamental factor. If the 
US asset price bubble was a consequence of large global imbalances brought on by strong 
demand for dollar-denominated assets, we would have seen an appreciation of the US dollar 
in the years preceding the crisis. Moreover, global interest rates were low, but not at 
unprecedented levels, and other economies experienced similar patterns of housing prices 
without comparable damage to their financial institutions. The distorted incentives and 
flawed regulatory structures surrounding US financial institutions were a distinctly American 
feature that precipitated the current global financial crisis.  
Looking ahead, a sustained economic recovery seems unlikely until the uncertainty 
surrounding the solvency of major financial institutions has been resolved. There are 
substantial doubts about the potential success of the government’s bailout plan. The 
fundamental problem continues to be the political constraints on the government’s ability to 
obtain sufficient budget funds to recapitalize the financial system, leaving it with second-best 
options. Finally, the crisis and the large wealth losses may trigger a long-sought rebalancing 
of the nation’s saving and investment and a necessary reduction in the current account 
balance. That will create substantial challenges for other countries that have become overly 
dependent on exports to the US market. 
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